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THE ORIGIN OF THE NEGOTIABLE
PROMISSORY NOTE
Jacob J. Rabinowitzt
The origin of the negotiable promissory note has been widely dis-
cussed by legal historians. Brunner, who has devoted a number of
articles to the subject,1 maintains that the principles underlying the
negotiable promissory note are traceable to Germanic law and that the
main elements of the negotiability clause are discernible in Lombard
documents of the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries.' Under the Ger-
manic law of procedure, Brunner asserts, the emphasis was upon the
validity or invalidity of the defendant's defense and not upon the
validity of the plaintiff's claim. In other words, it was incumbent upon
the defendant to show why he was not liable to the plaintiff. There-
fore, he says, when the promise ran to the person in whose hands the
instrument would appear, the defendant had no valid defense against
the holder of the instrument who was not required to show how the
defendant became liable to him.3
It seems, however, that Brunner's so-called "principle of the Ger-
manic law of procedure," which supposedly lays stress upon the validity
of the defendant's defense-a most peculiar principle indeed-is but a
product of his own imagination. He cites no evidence whatsoever for
this principle, except the facts which he seeks to explain by it. Further-
more, Brunner would apparently have us believe that the spirit of the
Germanic law of procedure, having asserted itself through the Lom-
t Professor of Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Member of the New
York Bar.
1. See the following articles by Brunner: Das franwoesiche Inhaberpapier des
Mittelaters, in F.SSCHRIFT FUER H. THoEL 7 (Germany 1879), reprinted in 1 BRuNERa,
ABHANDLUNGr ZUR RECHTSGESCICaHTE 458 (1931); Carta und Notitia, in Com-
MENTATIONES PHILOLOGICGA IN HONOREm TH. MOmSmENi 570 (1877), reprinted in 1
BRUNNER, op. cit. supra at 458; Zur Geschichte des Inhaberpapiers in Deutsch-
land, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT F. D. GES. HANDELSRECHT [hereinafter ZEITSCHRiFT] 225 (Ger-
many 1878); Die Fraeukisch-romaniscle Urkunde, 22 ZEITSCHrFT 59, 105 (Germany
1877).
2. Brunner, Die fraenkisch-romanische Urkunde, 22 ZEITscHRIFT 59, 105 (Germany
1877). Brunner's theory of the origin of negotiable instruments is followed by Jenks,
The Early History of Negotiable Instrnents, in 3 SELEC EssAys iN ANGLo-A-MER-
icA-N LEGAL HIsToRY 51 (1909) and by Holdsworth, The Origin and Early History
of Negotiable Instruments, 31 L.Q. Rsv. 12 (1915).
3. 1 BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 539-40. See also Holdsworth, supra note 2,
at 20.
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bard notaries of the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries, lay dormant for
about three centuries until it came back to life again in the French
bearer instruments of the early fourteenth century.
The theory of the Germanic origin of the negotiable promissory
note has been effectively refuted by Freundt.4 He has shown that the
clauses in the Lombard documents, mostly deeds of conveyance, which
Brunner considered the prototypes of the negotiable promissory note,
have nothing to do with negotiability. Of late it has been recognized
by historians of English law that at least in England in the thirteenth
century the Jews played an important part in the development of the
negotiable promissory note.' But the full story of the origin of this
legal device still remains to be told.
THE NEGOTIABLE PROMIssORY NOTE WITH THE ORDER CLAUSE
The forerunner of order paper, in the form of a promise to pay
to a named individual or to "your messenger" (vel certo nuncio tuo
or misso tuo), begins to appear regularly in Genoa about the middle
of the twelfth century.' Brunner correctly points out that the term
nuncius in these documents does not mean just a messenger (bote).7
The nuncius was a true agent vested with authority to settle or com-'
promise the claim on behalf of the principal. The appointment of a
nuncius was a formal act requiring the preparation of a notarial docu-
ment. Brunner cites such a document from Italy, dated 1156, which
reads in part as follows: Ego Solimnanus facio te Ogerius de Ripa
nuncium meum ad recuperandum tarenos 1255 . . . quos mnihi debet
Jordanus de Molino.'
4. 2 FREUNDT, WERTPAPIERE IM ANTIKEN UND FRUEMITTELALTERICHEN RECHTE
76-121 (1910).
5. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law,
51 HARv. L. Rlv. 813 (1938). See also Bailey, Assignment of Debts in England front
the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century, 47 L.Q. REv. 516, 534 (1931). The theory that
the negotiable instrument is of Jewish origin was first advanced by Auerbach. See
AUERBACH, DAS JUEDISCHE OBLIGATIONsREC RT 250-58, 270-90 (1871). He was, how-
ever, unable to draw upon the documentary material, particularly from Anglo-Jewish
and Spanish-Jewish sources, which has since become available. Also, his assertion that
the negotiable instrument was known and used by the Jews in talmudic times seems
to be without support in the Talmud. While it is true that the legal principle upon
which Jewish authorities of the later Middle Ages based the validity of negotiable
instruments is found in the Talmud, it does not seem that this principle was made
use of until the later Middle Ages.
6. See, e.g., 1 IL CARTOLARE DI GIOVANNI SCRMA 3, 10 (Documenti e Studi per la
Storia del Commercia e del Dirito Commerciale Italiano no. 1, 1935) (documents
used in 1155) ; id. 28, 34, 62 (documents used in 1156) ; id. 28, 411, 414 (documents
used in 1160).
7. "Der nuncius, message, ist in diesen Urkunden nicht als ein blosser Bote,
sondern gleich dem procureur als ein Befollmaechtigter aufzufassen, der quittieren und
klagen darf." 1 BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 554.
8. 1 IL CARTOLARE DI GIOVANNI SCRIBA 59 (Documenti e Studi per la Storia del
Commercia e Del dirito Commerciale Italiano no. 1, 1935) (document used in 1156).
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The vel certo nuncio tuo clause also occurs in twelfth century
documents from Constantinople I and from Venice.1' In Marseilles 1
it is found in the first half of the thirteenth century, and in England 12
it appears in the second half of the same century. The term nuncius
is also used in England in the thirteenth century in connection with
several transactions involving the assignment of bonds by Jews, where
the assignee is referred to as the Jew's nuncius.'3
The question arises how did the word nuncius, which in its
original sense denotes a mere messenger, come to mean an agent vested
with authority to act on behalf of the principal, or even an assignee
who acts in his own behalf ? This question becomes still more pointed
when we bear in mind that the Latin term most approximating that
of agent for the collection of a debt is procurator. Indeed, in thir-
teenth century instruments for the appointment of agents we find that
while the term nuncius is still retained, the term procurator is added.
4
The answer to the above question is that the origin of the docu-
ments using the term nuncius in the sense of agent is Jewish. There
is only one word in Hebrew for both messenger and agent. The word
is shaliah, which is derived from the verb shaloah (to send). The dif-
ference between the noun shaliah in the sense of messenger and the
same noun in the sense of agent can only be gathered from the verb
which is used in connection with this noun. A shaliah-messenger is
sent (shalah shaliah); a shaliah-agent is made (asah shaliah). In
the legal literature of the Jews the term shaliah usually means an agent.
Thus, the part of Maimonides' Code which deals with agency and part-
nership is called Hilkot Sheluhin Ve-Shutafin-The Laws of Agents
and Partners.
The messenger (shaliah) or the representative (ba-koah) of the
creditor is referred to in some of the forms in the formulary of R. Judah
Barzillai (eleventh century, Spain)." In a Hebrew bond from Bar-
celona, dated 1112 and made by a Jew to a non-Jew, the debtor under-
takes to pay to the creditor or to his representative (ba-koah) 
6
9. 7 ARCHIVIO VENETO 97-98 (Italy 1874) (document used in 1148).
10. 7 id. at 149-50 (document used in 1168).
11. See, e.g., 1 BLANCARD, DOCUMENTS INEDITS SUR LE COMMERCE DE MARSEILLES
12, 38, 48, 52 (1884).
12. See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 227 (2d ed. 1899).
13. See 1 CALENDAR OF THE PLEA ROLLS OF THE EXCHEQUER OF THE JEWS 223
(Rigg ed. 1905) (1218-72); 2 id. at 255 (Rigg ed. 1910) (1273-75).
14. See, e.g., 6 HIsTORrAE PATRIAE MONUMENTA col. 1356 (1836) (document
used in 1228) ; 6 id. col. 1479 (document used in 1248) ; 1 BLANCARD, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 60 (document used in 1234).
15. R. JUDAH BARzILLAI, SEEaR HA-SHTAROTH (Formulary) nos. 7, 14, 34, 42
(Halberstam ed., Berlin 1898).
16. VALEICROSA, DOCUMENTS HEBRAICA DE JUEUS CATALANS no. 21 (Institut
d'Estudis catalans, Memories, vol. 1, fasc. 3 1927).
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The Jews, who had occasion to use Latin documents in their
dealings with Christians, simply translated the word shaliah, which in
its original sense means messenger, by the Latin word nuncius or
missus having the same meaning. Christians followed the example set
by the Jews. So much so that in the twelfth century they used the
phrase facio nuncium-I make an agent-which corresponds to the
Hebrew oseh shaliah. Even in the thirteenth century, when Italian
and French notaries had become familiar with Roman legal terms,
those arch-conservatives still retained the terms facio and nuncius,
though they added the words constituo and ordino to the former and
the word procurator to the latter.17
In addition to the term nuncius or missus, the documents con-
taining the vel certo nuncio tuo clause reveal several other marks of
Jewish influence. We shall list these seriatim.
1. The documents from Genoa 18 and those from Marseilles 19
are framed in the form of an acknowledgment (recognizance) of the
debt by the debtor. In the Genoa documents it is the word profiteor
or confiteor (I profess or confess) that is used; in most of the Mar-
seilles documents it is the phrase profiteor et recognosco ' (I profess
and acknowledge) and in some profiteor et in veritate recognosco
(I profess and in truth acknowledge). It is the last phrase which
betrays the Jewish origin of the form. This phrase is an adap-
tation of the Hebrew modeh hodaah gemurah (acknowledge a true ac-
knowledgment). As the writer has shown elsewhere,2 the Hebrew
phrase, which is translated in a thirteenth century document from Eng-
land as recognosco veram recognitionem, grew out of certain rules
of Jewish law with regard to the validity of recognizances.
2. The Genoa, Constantinople, Venice and Marseilles documents
contain a provision for a general lien upon the obligor's property in
17. See documents cited in note 14 supra.
18. See documents cited in note 6 supra.
19. See documents cited in note 11 supra.
20. See 1 BLtAxcARD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 62-74. In a Spanish document of
1226 (BAR, DiE JuDEN im CHRIsTLIcHE SPANiEN 85-86 (1929)), representing
an acquittance made by a Jew, the same phrase occurs. In a number of twelfth century
acquittances from Montpelier the following variations of this phrase occur: "Scio et
vero cognosco"-LiaEa INSTRUMENTORUm MEMORALium, CARTULAIaE DES GuILMo
DE MONTPELiER 329 (1884) (document used in 1165) ; "Scio et in veritate cognosco et
assero"-id. at 332-33 (document used in 1196-1197); "Scio et in veritate cum hac
carta cognosco"--id. at 344 (document used in 1200); "Scimus et in veritate cum
hac carta cognoscimus et profitemur"-id at 156 (document used in 1142).
21. See Rabinowitz, The Influence of Jewzsh Law on the Development of English
Law, in 1 THE JEws: THEIR Hisroay, CULTURE AND RELIGION 501-02 (Finkelstein
ed. 1949).
22. 1 ABRAHAMS, STOKES AND LOEWE, STARRS AND JEWISH CHARTERS IN THE
BRITIsH MUSEUm 4-5 (1930) (document used in 1234).
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favor of the obligee, which has been a regular feature of the Jewish
writing obligatory since talmudic times and possibly earlier.
In the Constantinople and Venice documents the clause providing
for a general lien on the obligor's property contains a quaint phrase
which betrays the Jewish origin of the clause. The obligor binds "all
his lands and houses and all his property in this world" for the perform-
ance of his obligation. In the Constantinople document, dated 1148,
the clause in question reads:
"hec que suprascripta sunt si tibi non observavero tunc emendare
debeam cum meis heredibus, tibi et tuis heredibus omnia tua
suprascripta in duplum de terris et casis meis, et de omnibus que
habere visus fuero in hoc seculo." 's
In the document from Venice, dated 1168, the obligor's after-
acquired property is included within the scope of the lien, the clause
reading: ". . . de omnibus que nunc habeo vel in antea habere debeo
in hoc seculo." 24 In another document from Venice, dated 1173, the
clause in question reads: ". . . que nunc habemus aut in antea
habituri sumus in hoc seculo." " In the Jewish form of the writing
obligatory, for example in the formulary of Rab Hai Gaon (ca. 1000),
the obligor binds all property which he has and which he may acquire
in the future under heaven.8
3. The documents from Genoa contain a provision in which the
creditor is empowered, in case of default by the debtor, to enter upon
the debtor's property and obtain satisfaction of the debt therefrom.
This provision too is a regular feature of the Jewish writing obligatory
of the Middle Ages."
4. The documents from Marseilles 28 contain a clause in which
the debtor undertakes that in case of default in payment he is to pay
to the creditor the damages he may have suffered and the expenses
he may have incurred by reason of such default, and to the extent
23. 7 ARcrnmo VE mno 97-98 (Italy 1874).
24. 7 id. at 149-50.
25. 8 id. at 149-50.
26. Rab Hai Gaon, Sefer Ha-shtaroth (Formulary) no. 4 (Asaf ed.) published
in 1 TARfrrz (publication of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (Supp. 1930).
See also Rab Saadiah Gaon, Sefer Ha-shtaroth, published in SAADTAi 72 (Fishman
ed., Jerusalem 1942). It is interesting to note that the phrase all things under heaven
also occurs in some Constantinople and Venice releases, where the party executing
the release states: "Et nichil inde remansit de ulla re de sub celo." 7 ARcHIavo VE Ero
95 (Italy 1874) (document used in Constantinople in 1147) ; 8 id. at 138 (document
used in Venice in 1161).
27. See Rabinowitz, Jewish and Lombard Law, 12 JEwisH SocIAL SIuDiEs
320 (1951).
28. See, e.g., 1 BLANCARD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 38, 48, 52, 75.
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of such damages and expenses the creditor shall be believed on his
simple word. As the writer has shown elsewhere,29 a similar clause
is found in Jewish documents considerably earlier and is based upon
a principle of Jewish law going back to talmudic times.
5. In some of the documents containing the vel certo nuncio tuo
clause, the coin in which the debt is payable is described as boni et
justi ponderis-good and of correct weight." This description of the
coin 8 ' is a regular feature of Jewish bonds throughout the Middle
Ages and is also found in the Babylonian Talmud82 in the name of
a third century authority.
All of the above, in its cumulative effect, leads to the conclusion
that the vel certo nuncio tuo clause is of Jewish origin. We shall now
turn our attention to the alternative bearer clause.
THE PROMISSORY NOTE WITH THE ALTERNATIVE BEARER CLAUSE
The vel certo nuncio tuo clause was undoubtedly an important
step towards achieving negotiability. The debtor who bound himself
in advance to pay the creditor's agent could not refuse to recognize
the right of the holder of the note, who was the creditor's agent, to
demand payment. But this clause did not achieve true negotiability,
the essence of which is that the holder of the instrument may demand
payment in his own right. True negotiability was only achieved by
the clause in which the maker bound himself to a named individual
or to the bearer of the note. Under this clause, the holder of the note
was just as much entitled to demand payment in his own right as the
party named therein.
The earliest French note with an alternative bearer clause-
a IV, ou 6. qui cette lettre portera-cited by Brunner, is dated 1291.88
But evidence of the use of the alternative bearer clause by Jews in notes
written in Hebrew is found considerably earlier. As already noted
by Beutel,8 4 the records of the Exchequer of The Jews in England
contain a Latin translation of a Hebrew note with an alternative bearer
clause made by one Jew to another as early as 1272. The translation
reads as follows:
29. See Rabinowitz, Some Remarks on the Evasion of the Usary Laws it the
Middle Ages, 37 HARv. THaEO. REv. 52-53 (1944).
30. See documents quoted in GoLDscHmrT, UNivERsAL-GEscHicHTE DES HAN rs-
RECHTS 421-26 (1891).
31. See Rabinowitz, Jewish and Lombard Law, 12 JEWiSH SOCIAL STtumIES 320
(1951).
32. Baba Metzia 44b.
33. 1 BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 508.
34. Beutel, supra note 5, at 823.
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"Diei le Evesk', Judeus, recognovit per starrum suum, quod
tenetur Abrahe, filio Joscei, de Eboraco, in xii 1. sterlingorum,
reddendis ei, vel cuicunque presens starrum deferenti, ad festum S.
Michaelis anno etc. xxxvi, et si dictum terminum transierit, dicto
Abrahe licebit mutuo accipere dictos denarios per manum alicuius
Christiani ad usuram, videlicet, pro una libra ii denarios in
septimand; et pro toto predicto debito et lucro di~tus Diei obligavit
dicto Abrahe unam domum . . . dum dictus Abraham vel
aliqui assignatorum suorum habeant dictum starrum, dictus Diei
non possit alienare (allegare?) aliquam acquietanciam de predicto
debito nisi aliquod starrum de acquietancia inde facta per predictum
Abraham . ." 35
A promissory note with an alternative bearer clause, written in
Hebrew and dated 1249, is also found in the collection of Hebrew
shtaroth published by Davis.36
Evidence of the use of the promissory note with the alternative
bearer clause by the Jews in the thirteenth century is still more abundant
for Spain than for England. This evidence is all the more important,
since it comprises a detailed discussion by some of the leading Jewish
jurists of Spain of the principles underlying the validity of the prom-
issory note with the alternative bearer clause.
The question of the validity and legal effect of such a note came
before Rabbi Meir Abulafia of Toledo, Spain (died in 1244). The
portion of the instrument which is quoted by Rabbi Meir reads as
follows:
"Reuben and Simeon have constituted us witnesses, with
complete kinyan 3 7 from now, to the effect that there rests upon
them a true obligation by reason of a loan, with credence, to pay
eighty gold denars to R. Nassi Jacob, or to him who produces this
writing, Jew or Gentile, from this day to March of this year,
without dispute and without asking for the judicial extension of
time. And if Reuben and Simeon, the aforementioned borrowers,
fail to pay the said amount to the said lender, or to him who pro-
duces this writing, Jew or Gentile, they shall pay all the expendi-
tures that the said R. Jacob may incur in collecting the debt from
them, or from one of them, up to five gold denars per hundred for
35. 15 SELDEx SocimEy PULICATiOTS, SELECT PLEAS, STARRS, AND OTHER REc-
ORDS FROM THE RoLLs OF THE EXCHEQUER OF THE JEws 65 (Rigg. ed. 1902).
36. HEBREW Drams OF ENGLiSH JEWs BEFoRE 1290, no. 207 (M. D. Davis ed.
1888).
37. "Kinyan (literally: acquisition)-a formality, stimulating an exchange, wherein
the party to whom a transfer of property is made, or toward whom an obligation is
assumed (or the witnesses to the transaction on his behalf), delivers to the party
making the transfer, or assuming the obligation, some object, such as a scarf or a
handkerchief, to make the transaction binding and enforceable." THE CODE OF
MAMOIDES BIC. xm: THE BooK OF Civm LAWS 332 (Yale Judaica Series vol. 2,
Rabinowitz transl. 1949).
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each month that shall have passed after the said term; and the
said borrowers, for themselves and for their heirs after them, have
given to the said R. Jacob, with regard to every matter that may
arise out of this transaction, with regard to these expenditures
and with regard to all possible pleas that they might plead against
this debt and these expenditures, the credence accorded to two
lawful witnesses. .,, 38
There can be not the slightest doubt that the above document repre-
sents a true negotiable instrument of the alternative bearer type, which
may be enforced by the bearer in his own right, and not just as an
agent or representative of the payee named in the instrument. That
it was so understood by all concerned becomes obvious from Rabbi
Meir's discussion of the instrument.
In the course of his discussion, he states that there was advanced
against the validity of the above instrument an argument based upon
the following two rules of Jewish law: (1) A conveyance made, or an
obligation assumed, in favor of a person yet unborn is invalid, the
unborn person lacking capacity to acquire any rights. (2) If any obliga-
tion is assumed toward several obligees, one of whom lacks capacity to
acquire any rights under the obligation, the obligation is void as to
all of the obligees. The description of the obligee in the instrument as
"he who produces this instrument," being general, includes within its
scope persons yet unborn at the time of the making of the instrument.
As to these persons the instrument is invalid under the first rule.
Therefore, it was argued, the instrument is void as to all others by
virtue of the second rule. Rabbi Meir, however, held the note valid.
As to the above argument advanced against its validity, his answer
was that the note, being ambiguous, should be so construed as to uphold
its validity, and that therefore the phrase "he who produces the in-
strument" should be construed as referring only to those persons who
were in being at the time of the making of the note. It thus appears
that the bearer's right to enforce payment was considered to be en-
tirely independent of that of the named payee, and that the bearer was
in no way considered the payee's representative.
The question of the legal effect of an alternative bearer clause
came also before Rabbi Solomon b. Adreth (1245-1310) who de-
cided that the holder was entitled to demand payment without produc-
ing an instrument of assignment. 9 The holder, Rabbi Solomon held,
is on a par with the named obligee. The obligation runs to the one
38. SER OR LATZADIKIm no. 262 (Saloniki 1799).
39. RESPONSA OF R. SOLOmON B. ADmRB no. 921 (Lemberg 1812).
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as well as to the other. All that is necessary for the holder to qualify
as an obligee under the terms of the note is to produce the note.
As a necessary logical consequence of the rationale of the holder's
right to sue, Rabbi Solomon, like Rabbi Meir before him, added that
where the holder of the note was not yet born at the time the note was
made to the original obligee he would be unable to sue on it in his own
name. The rule being that one cannot validly bind himself to a person
yet unborn, the holder who was born after the note was made could
not have been comprehended within the terms of the obligation clause.
It is interesting to contrast the rule stated by Rabbi Meir and
Rabbi Solomon relative to the holder who was unborn at the time the
note was made with the rule found in fourteenth century French
sources that "homme mort n'a porteur de lettres" 40 (a dead man has
no bearer of letters). The one rule stands for the proposition that the
holder of the note is a principal, and as such he must be in being at
the time the obligation is incurred, whereas the other rule stands for
the proposition that the holder is an. agent of the obligee named in the
note and that the death of his principal terminates the agency.
It will be noted that the notes discussed by Rabbi Meir and Rabbi
Solomon were of the so-called alternative bearer type, that is, they were
payable to a named payee or to the bearer of the instrument. Such a
note, while it is in principle freely transferable and does not require an
instrument of assignment in order to enable the holder to sue on it, was
in some Jewish communities not given the full effect its terms implied.
In Toledo, for instance, it was customary to require that the holder
produce an instrument of assignment executed by the named obligee.
Rabbi Asher b. Jechiel (1250-1327) states in one of his responsa 4
that the custom is to be respected and followed by the courts. And so
custom imposed upon the negotiability of these instruments a restric-
tion which was opposed to principle. But the ingenuity of creditors
was quite a match to the conservatism of the courts. Soon the instru-
ment with the pure bearer clause, without a named payee, made its
appearance. The courts could not require from the holder an instru-
ment of assignment, executed by the original obligee, since the latter's
name did not even appear in the note. They had no choice but to recog-
nize the holder's right to sue on the note without producing an instru-
ment of assignment. A case involving such a note with a pure bearer
clause is discussed in another responsum 2 by Rabbi Asher b. Jechiel,
who divides into two parts his argument in favor of the holder's right
40. See 1 BRUmNNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 517.
41. RESPONSA OF R. AsHER B. JEcHI L c. 68, § 7 (1885).
42. Id. § 9. See also id. § 11.
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to sue. In the first part he says that an obligor may enter into an
obligation to a person who is not present at the transaction, either
personally or through an appointed agent, by virtue of the principle of
zekhiah, which is to the effect that a right may be validly conferred
upon a party through the mediation of another, even in the absence of
the party upon whom the right is conferred and without his knowledge.
In the second part he says that one may validly bind himself to an
unknown person, if that person is ascertainable in the future, and
cites the case of King Saul, who bound himself to reward the person
who would defeat Goliath.
It seems that the true negotiable note, which was introduced by
the Jews before the middle of the thirteenth century and which was
based on the principle of zekhiah mentioned above, had a long struggle
for recognition against opposition by non-Jewish jurists. It was alien
to the principles of the Romanized jurisprudence of the time which
adhered to the maxim "alteri nemo stipulari potest." In France in
the fourteenth century, as we have seen above, the bearer was looked
upon as the agent of the named payee and the death of the payee
terminated his agency." In Spain under the Las Siete Partidas, com-
pleted about 1263, a promise in the form of "I promise to give you, or
so and so, such-and-such a thing" could not be enforced by the third
party.4
However, some twenty odd years after the completion of the Las
Siete Partidas we find several notes with an alternative bearer clause,
written in Spanish and made by non-Jews to Jewish creditors.45 These
notes contain, in addition to the alternative bearer clause, a clause
which indicates that they were patterned after the form of the Jewish
promissory note. I am referring to the clause in which the obligor
binds his property, movable and landed (bienes muebles et rayces), for
the performance of his obligation. The phrase bienes muebles et rayces
is most peculiar. One would expect instead bienes muebles et im-
muebles, movable and immovable being almost a natural dichotomy.
How then did it happen that in these documents the phrase bienes
muebles et rayces is used? The answer is that this phrase is an exact
43. Brunner states that from the beginning of the thirteenth century French
jurisprudence was under the strong influence of Roman law and that it was by rea-
son of this influence that in the fourteenth century the question arose whether the
bearer of a promissory note with an alternative bearer clause had an independent
right of action against the maker. Bearing in mind that the promissory note with the
alternative bearer clause appears in France only towards the end of the thirteenth
century, it is difficult to reconcile Brunner's statement with his view that this type of
note was an indigenous French product based upon the principles of Germanic law.
1 BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 540.
44. LAS SrrE PARTDAS 1095 (Scott transl. 1931).
45. 1 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPANOL 394 (1924).
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translation of the talmudic metaltelin umekarkein46 (movable and
landed property) universally found in all Jewish documents of an ob-
ligatory nature, in which the debtor binds his property, movable and
landed, for the performance of his obligation.4 7
The close dependance of the alternative bearer clause, both in
Spain and in France, upon a Jewish model may also be seen in the
wording of this clause. In France, it is ou a. qui cette lettre portera or
apportera 48 (or to him who will bring this document), while in Spain
it is o a quien esta carta mostrare 49 (or to him who will produce this
document). The difference in the wording between the French and
the Spanish clauses corresponds exactly to the difference in the Hebrew
wording between the Jewish documents stemming from England and
those stemming from Spain. In the Spanish-Jewish documents it is
mosi 5  (he who will produce), while in the Anglo-Jewish documents
it is mebi 51 (he who will bring). Both of these Hebrew terms are
used in the Talmud 52 with respect to legal documents and are certainly
not literal translations of the corresponding Spanish and French words.
While the Jews of Spain made use of one of these talmudic terms,
the Jews of England and France made use of the other, translating
as the occasion arose into the vernacular. Hence, the difference be-
tween the wording in the Spanish and French alternative bearer clauses.
In addition to the fact that the use of the promissory note with
the alternative bearer clause is found among the Jews of Spain and of
England at a considerably earlier time than it is found anywhere in
Europe among non-Jews, there is other evidence which points to the
Jewish origin of this type of note. Some of the special rules of law
applicable to the negotiable promissory note seem to be traceable to
Jewish law. One of these is the rule concerning protest. Thoel and
Brunner are of the opinion that from the very beginning protest was
nothing but evidence of presentment, which was necessary in order
to put the debtor on a negotiable instrument in default.5" Gold-
schmidt, on the other hand, maintains that protest was originally a
46. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Bathra 44b.
47. See, e.g., Rab Hai Gaon, supra note 26, no. 3.
48. See 1 BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 508-09.
49. See documents cited in note 45 supra.
50. See BAm, op. cit. supra note 20, at 963-64, 979-80, 1003.
51. See HaNaw DFmas OF ENGLISH JEVS BFxoRE 1290, nos. 28, 93, 207 (M. D.
Davis ed. 1888).
52. MISHNAH, Gittin 1, 1; Ketuboth 13, 8-9.
53. See 12 ENDEMANN, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN HANDELS-SEE UND WECHSEL-
RECHT 158 n.15 (1883).
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warning to the debtor that upon default he will be liable to damages
and expenses."4 The earliest example of protest, cited by both Brunner
and Goldschmidt, is a document from Pisa dated 1335.,' The text of
this document, in which the payment of damages and expenses is
specifically mentioned, seems to support Goldschmidt's view. But
the question may still be asked: why was it necessary to warn the
debtor of the consequences of his default? The answer seems to be
that the requirement of protest is of Jewish origin and is based upon
the principle of Jewish law that no penalty is to be imposed upon a
person without a previous warning.5
In a promissory note with an alternative bearer clause written
in Hebrew and made by several Jews to Don Miguel Deca, banker of
Pamplona, in the year 1325, there is a postscript in which the obligors
state that in case of default they shall be liable, without protest, to a
penalty equal to the amount of the principal obligation.57  Similar
clauses are also contained in two other Hebrew notes from Pamplona
dated 139068 and 1451,1" respectively. The fact that as early as 1325
we find already a stipulation for a waiver of protest clearly indicates
that the requirement of protest in order to make the obligor liable to
a penalty goes beyond that date.
Another rule applicable to negotiable instruments which has a
close parallel in Jewish sources is that of grace. Under the law mer-
chant, the debtor on a negotiable instrument is entitled to several days
of grace after the due date of the note.60 A similar rule prevails in
Jewish law and is known as seman beth-din, which may be rendered
somewhat freely as judicial extension of time. Under this rule, a
debtor in default may ask the court for an extension of time in order
to enable him to raise the money necessary to pay the debt. This rule
is stated by Maimonides as follows:
"If the debtor said, 'I am willing to pay, but give me time, so
as to enable me to borrow from another or to pledge my property
or sell it, and I will bring the money,' the court gives him 30
days time. . . .1
54. GOLDSCHimT, op. cit. supra note 30, at 457 n.156.
55. 3 BOtNAiNI, STATuTI iNEDT DELLA CITA DE PISA DAL XII AL XIV SECOLO
202 n.15 (1870).
56. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Zebahin 106b-107a.
57. BAER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 963-64.
58. Id. at 979-80.
59. Id. at 1003.
60. See GormscHmnxr, SYsTEM DES HANELSEcHrs 280-81 (4th ed. 1892).
61. T E CODE OF MAIMONIDES BI. xIIm: THE BOOK OF CIVIL LAws 127 n.35
(Yale Judaica Series vol. 2, Rabinowitz transl. 1949).
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Rabbi Asher b. Jechiel 2 quotes Nachmanides (1205-1270) to the
effect that the rule about zeman beth-din is not a rule of strict law but
one of grace (rahamim). The similarity between seman beth-din and
the rule of grace in negotiable instruments, together with the other evi-
dence discussed above, is more than suggestive of the Jewish origin of
this rule.
62. COMMENTARY or BABA BATHRA 10, 25.
